The Supreme Court of the United States recently declined to hear an appeal from John Nassif, a Florida man convicted for his role in the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. By denying certiorari, the justices left intact the lower court rulings that upheld his conviction under a federal statute prohibiting “parading, picketing, and demonstrating” within the Capitol. While the decision does not explicitly endorse the reasoning of the lower courts, it effectively affirms the outcome and preserves the government’s ability to prosecute similar cases under the same law. Nassif had argued that the statute violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, asserting that Capitol interior spaces should be treated as public forums where expressive activity receives heightened protection. The Supreme Court’s refusal to take the case leaves the prevailing interpretation adopted by the federal appellate court in Washington, D.C., as the controlling precedent, ensuring that the parading charge—one of the most common misdemeanor counts arising from January 6—remains legally viable.

Nassif, 57, was sentenced to seven months in prison following convictions for multiple misdemeanor offenses, including disorderly conduct and unlawful entry. Federal prosecutors had recommended a sentence between 10 and 16 months, emphasizing the seriousness of the events that disrupted Congress’s certification of the 2020 presidential election. Court records show that Nassif entered the Capitol after it had already been breached and remained inside for fewer than ten minutes. His defense team argued that his actions were limited, nonviolent, and did not involve property damage, framing them as “core First Amendment expression” rather than criminal activity. Despite these arguments, jurors determined that his unauthorized presence during a chaotic event met the statutory criteria for the charges. In sentencing, the court balanced mitigating and aggravating factors, including the broader context of the riot, the need to deter similar behavior, and Nassif’s personal background. Though his prison term was shorter than prosecutors’ request, it reflected the judiciary’s consistent approach to unlawful entry during the Capitol breach.

Lower courts, including the D.C. Circuit, rejected Nassif’s constitutional claims. A three-judge panel ruled that the Capitol’s interior is not a public forum open to general protest activity. Under First Amendment law, government property falls into three categories—traditional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums—with varying levels of protection for speech. The court concluded that the Capitol constitutes a nonpublic forum, allowing reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restrictions to maintain order and security. The panel emphasized that the Capitol is not generally open for public demonstrations and that Congress’s legislative duties justify restrictions that would not apply in parks or sidewalks typically associated with public expression. The ruling reinforces the government’s authority to regulate access to sensitive facilities, particularly those critical to governmental functions, underscoring the legal rationale behind prosecuting unauthorized activity during events like January 6.

Nassif’s petition to the Supreme Court argued that there was a conflict between the D.C. Circuit’s approach and certain rulings from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which recognized parts of the Capitol, such as the Rotunda, as public forums in other contexts. Nassif contended that this divergence created uncertainty over the scope of First Amendment protections within the Capitol complex and required clarification from the nation’s highest court. His legal team maintained that peaceful demonstrators should not face criminal liability for expressive activity in historically accessible areas. However, U.S. District Judge John Bates previously upheld the parading statute, citing established precedents permitting reasonable restrictions on speech inside government buildings dedicated to official business. The government emphasized that the law serves compelling interests: preventing disruption of congressional proceedings and safeguarding lawmakers, staff, and visitors. By declining review, the Supreme Court allowed the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation to remain the controlling authority for federal prosecutions in the district.

The decision has broader implications for ongoing and future January 6 prosecutions. The Department of Justice has charged over 460 individuals under the same parading statute, making it the most frequently applied misdemeanor among more than 1,450 defendants connected to the riot. Unlike the obstruction statute, which has seen the Supreme Court narrow its scope in United States v. Fischer, the parading law remains comparatively straightforward for addressing unauthorized entry and protest activity within the Capitol. In recent rulings, such as United States v. DeCarlo, judges have imposed more demanding standards for applying obstruction charges, complicating some felony prosecutions. In contrast, the parading statute offers prosecutors a reliable tool to enforce accountability for unlawful presence and expressive conduct inside the Capitol, now reinforced by the Supreme Court’s inaction in Nassif’s appeal.

January 6 prosecutions continue to evolve within a broader legal and political landscape. Nearly 600 defendants face charges of assaulting, resisting, or impeding law enforcement officers, with arrests and indictments continuing years after the events. High-profile cases, including convictions of Stewart Rhodes and Enrique Tarrio for seditious conspiracy, highlight the government’s focus on individuals who orchestrated or coordinated aspects of the riot, even if they did not engage in violence personally. Meanwhile, discussions of potential executive clemency have persisted, with former President Donald Trump indicating a willingness to pardon some defendants, though details on scope and timing remain unclear. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Nassif’s case reflects judicial restraint rather than a broad ruling on constitutional rights, allowing the established framework for prosecutions to proceed largely unchanged.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s inaction leaves lower court precedents intact and preserves the government’s authority to enforce the parading statute as part of its broader January 6 prosecutorial strategy. Nassif’s individual sentence and appeal serve as a case study in the interplay between First Amendment claims and statutory limits on access to sensitive government buildings. The decision underscores the distinction between public forums and nonpublic forums, affirming that reasonable restrictions on expressive activity are permissible in spaces dedicated to official functions. By leaving the law undisturbed, the court ensures consistency in ongoing prosecutions, reinforcing the legal tools available to hold individuals accountable for their role in the Capitol breach while maintaining the balance between security and constitutional rights.